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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND WEBB, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a ] 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM ] 
REAGAN, individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, ] 
individually, ] 
Defendants-Petitioners. 
i Supreme Court 
) N o . 890234 
i Category 13 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Roland Webb ("Webb") respectfully submits this brief in 
opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by R.O.A. 
General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), William Reagan ("Reagan") and Douglas 
T. Hall ("Hall") (collectively "Petitioners"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners have assigned error to the Utah Court of 
Appeals1 decision reported in Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 106 
Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a copy of which opinion 
is attached hereto as Appendix A-l through A-6. 
Only the four specific questions presented for review 
in petitioner's brief pursuant to Rule 46 of the Utah Supreme 
Court Rules are before this Court. The issues of reasonable time 
and proper purpose, which are argued in the body of Petitioners1 
brief, are not presented as questions for review under Rule 4 6 
and therefore, are not properly before this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)-(c) (1986): 
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record, 
upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall 
have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or 
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any 
proper purpose, its books and records of account, 
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts 
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably 
related to the person's interest as a shareholder. 
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or 
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts 
from its books and records of account, minutes, and 
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall 
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of 
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in 
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by 
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall 
be a defense to any action for penalties under this 
section that the person suing therefor has within two 
years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders 
of such corporation or any other corporation or has 
aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of 
shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly 
used any information secured through any prior 
examination of the books and records of account, or 
minutes, or record of shareholders of such corporation 
or any other corporation, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand, 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) (1986): 
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of 
record of shares in a corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action was originally brought by Webb to compel 
R.O.A. and Reagan to allow Webb to conduct a shareholder 
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examination of the books and records of account of R.O.A, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and to recover the 
statutory penalties imposed under § 16-10-47(c) for each refusal 
by R.O.A., Reagan and Hall to allow such examination. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Third Judicial District Court, on cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment, ruled that Webb had no inspection 
rights because he had ceased being a shareholder within the 
meaning of the statute. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's ruling and remanded the case to the district 
court directing it to (i) grant summary judgment in favor of 
Webb, (ii) grant injunctive relief requiring R.O.A. to permit 
Webb's requested shareholder inspection, (iii) impose separate 
statutory penalties against each of the Petitioners for each 
separate refusal to allow Webb's shareholder inspection and (iv) 
determine and award any additional damages suffered by Webb as a 
result of each of Petitioners' refusals to allow Webb's 
shareholder inspection. 
Statement of Facts 
By written agreement dated July 7, 1981 (the 
"Agreement"), Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A., a Utah corporation. 
(R. at 62-78, 483-484). Reagan obtained 80% of the stock of 
R.O.A. and Webb and his wife acquired the remaining 20% stock 
interest. (R. at 34, 203, 274). 
The July 7, 1981 Agreement provided, among other 
things, that R.O.A. had an option to purchase the Webb's stock at 
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a price to be determined by independent appraisals. (R. at 62-
78). By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice of its 
exercise of its option. (R. at 43, 78A, 207, 280, 484, 508). On 
April 20, 1987, Webb notified R.O.A. and Reagan that he was 
exercising his right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to 
examine the books and records of R.O.A. to determine its 
financial condition and to verify the accuracy of its books and 
records prior to submitting it to an independent appraisal. (R. 
at 53, 485). 
On or about May 5, 1987, Norman Clark, Vice-President 
of Administration and Finance of R.O.A., informed Webb that 
Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 1987, and 
insisted that Webb defer his examination until May 18, 1987. (R. 
at 54, 485). On May 18, 1987, Webb renewed in writing his 
request to examine the books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 55-56, 
485, 514). By letter dated May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel notified 
Reagan that Webb's accountants would begin their examination at 
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, a regular business day, at 
R.O.A.'s corporate offices in Salt Lake City. (R. at 57, 93, 
485) . 
Webb's agents, certified public accountants with the 
accounting firm of Peat Marwick Main & Co., and Webb's counsel, 
Victoria E. Brieant, Esq., arrived at the offices of R.O.A. at 
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, to begin their inspection 
of R.O.A.'s books and records. (R. at 93, 485-486). William H. 
Adams ("Adams"), corporate counsel for R.O.A., and Reagan refused 
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to permit either Webb's counsel or Webb's accountants to inspect 
the books and records of R.O.A. that day. R.O.A.'s, Reagan's and 
Adams' refusal to permit Webb's inspection was confirmed by 
letter dated May 26, 1987, from Adams. (R. at 58, 94). 
On June 3, 1987, Webb repeated his demand to examine 
the books and records of R.O.A. Webb designated 10:00 a.m. on 
Friday, June 5, 1987, a regular business day, at R.O.A.'s 
corporate offices in Salt Lake City as the time and place for the 
examination. (R. at 59-60, 94, 485). On June 4, 1987, Webb's 
counsel telephoned Adams to determine whether R.O.A. would permit 
Webb to proceed with the examination. (R. at 95, 485-486). 
Adams told Webb's counsel that Reagan and R.O.A. refused to allow 
the examination because it would allegedly disrupt its business 
and because there were no employees available to locate the 
company's files. (R. at 95). 
At 5:00 p.m. on June 4, 1987, Adams caused to be 
delivered to counsel for Webb a letter dated June 4, 1987, in 
which Adams stated that R.O.A. would not allow Webb, his agents 
or attorneys to examine the books and records of R.O.A. until 
June 15, 1987. (R. at 61, 95-96). 
On June 15, 1987, the examination date specified by Adams, 
Webb's counsel and certified public accountants from Peat Marwick 
Main & Co. retained by Webb arrived at the corporate offices of 
R.O.A. at 9:00 a.m. to begin the examination. (R. at 96). Hall 
and Reagan informed Webb's counsel for the first time that it was 
their position that Webb was no longer a shareholder of R.O.A. 
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because R.O.A. had exercised its option to purchase Webb's shares 
and refused the inspection. (R. at 96). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in 
holding that a shareholder of record of a Utah corporation has a 
statutory right to examine the corporation's books and records 
until he ceases to be a shareholder of record. A shareholder 
does not cease to be a shareholder of record until his shares are 
paid for and his stock is endorsed and transferred on the books 
and records of the corporation. Consequently, R.O.A.'s mere 
notice to Webb of its exercise of an option to purchase his 
R.O.A. stock did not terminate Webb's shareholder status or 
extinguish his statutory right of examination. 
POINT II: The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in 
holding that Webb did not waive his statutory right of inspection 
in view of Section 16 of the Agreement which states, "The 
Stockholders shall retain all their rights as stockholders of the 
Corporation, except those specifically modified by this 
Agreement." The Agreement contains no express or implied waiver 
by Webb of his statutory right of inspection. 
POINT III: As stated at the beginning of this brief, 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that as a matter of law Webb's 
stated purpose for examining R.O.A.'s books and records is a 
"proper purpose" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-47(b), has not been properly brought before this Court. 
Nonetheless, determining the value of Webb's stock, ascertaining 
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the propriety of certain business conducted by the R.O.A.'s 
officers and ascertaining the accuracy and integrity of the 
corporation's recordkeeping are, as a matter of law, proper 
purposes for Webb's examination of R.O.A.'s books and records. 
POINT IV: The Court of Appeals correctly concluded, as a 
matter of law, that Webb's request to examine R.O.A.'s books and 
records during R.O.A.'s normal business hours was a request to 
examine such books and records at a "reasonable time" within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b). 
POINT V; The Court of Appeals did not err in holding 
that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) imposes against each 
corporation and each of its officers and agents who violates Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), a separate penalty for each separate 
violation, equal to 10% of the value of the shares owned by the 
shareholder (but not to exceed $5,000), in addition to other 
damages or remedies afforded by law. The Court of Appeals 
correctly observed that the undisputed record on appeal shows 
that R.O.A., on three occasions, and Reagan, on two occasions, 
each violated Webb's shareholder examination rights. 
Consequently, the statutory penalties ordered by the Court of 
Appeals to be assessed against each of them are proper as a 
matter of law. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I, 
WEBB IS A SHAREHOLDER OF R.O.A. AND HAS A 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO INSPECT THE BOOKS AND 
RECORDS OF R.O.A. 
The pivotal question before the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals was whether Webb ceased to be a shareholder of 
R.O.A. by virtue of R.O.A.'s mere notice of the exercise of its 
option to purchase Webb's R.O.A. stock. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-47(b) (1986) provides that the right to inspect the books 
and records of a corporation is available to "any person who is a 
shareholder of record." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) defines 
"shareholder" as "one who is a holder of record of shares in a 
corporation." (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court observed 
in Goddard v. General Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 
P. 1103 (1920), that the "absolute right of inspection is 
limited . . . to those to whom the stock has been transferred on 
the books of the company." See also Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 
419, 285 P. 1011, 1012 (1930) ("One who regularly is a 
stockholder of record is presumed to be a bona fide 
stockholder."). 
The undisputed record in this case demonstrates that 
(i) Webb has at all times continued to be identified on the books 
of R.O.A. as a shareholder of record of R.O.A. (R. at 178-181); 
(ii) R.O.A. has tendered no consideration whatsoever to Webb for 
his stock; (iii) Webb has never endorsed his stock for transfer; 
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and (iv) Webb has not delivered his stock to R.O.A. or any other 
purchaser. (R. at 484). 
Petitioners have failed to distinguish any of the 
authorities cited by the Court of Appeals, all of which hold that 
the mere exercise of an option to purchase a shareholder's stock 
does not deprive the shareholder of his shareholder status and 
statutory right of inspection. Every court that has confronted 
this issue has held that a shareholder retains his statutory 
rights as a shareholder, despite being bound by contract to sell 
his shares to a third party, until the shares are paid for and 
transferred on the books of the corporation—in other words, as 
long as the contract remains executory. See 12A Fletcher Cyc. 
Corp. §§ 2230, 5613 (rev. perm. ed. 1986). 
In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles Enterprises, Inc., 252 
F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1958), the shareholders of the respondent 
corporation entered into a cross-purchase agreement which 
provided that upon the death of shareholder Cory Bishop, the 
surviving shareholders had the option to purchase his shares from 
his estate at book value. Following Bishop's death, Vose, one of 
the surviving shareholders, asserted his right to purchase 
Bishop's stock from his estate, claiming the stock was worthless 
and tendering $1.00 in payment. The administratrix of Bishop's 
estate argued successfully before the district court that the 
estate was entitled, as a shareholder, to examine the 
corporation's books and records after the option was exercised. 
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On appeal, the respondent corporation contended that 
"by virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to 
and ownership of Bishop's stock had passed to Vose immediately 
upon the election of the latter to purchase it." Id. (footnote 
omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held 
that even though an option had been exercised to purchase the 
stock, which exercise "vested in Vose the right to have the stock 
transferred to him upon payment of the purchase price, it did not 
divest the petitioner . . . of legal title to the shares or of 
the rights of a stockholder." Ici. Moreover, the court concluded 
that even assuming the agreement to sell the stock was valid and 
binding, 
the petitioner's right . . . to have access to the 
books and records of the corporation certainly will 
continue at least until after the proper amount of the 
purchase price has been authoritatively determined and 
has been paid. Until then it is obvious that the 
petitioner has a very real interest in securing 
accurate information as to the state of the respondent 
corporation's accounts. Id. 
In Knaebel v. Heiner. 673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983), the 
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the very argument asserted by 
Petitioners. Jeffrey Knaebel, a shareholder of Resource 
Associates of Alaska, Inc. ("RAA"), had entered into an agreement 
with RAA and the other two major shareholders of RAA to exchange 
his RAA stock for the stock of RAA's wholly owned subsidiary. 
Id. at 885-86. Heiner, RAA's records officer, refused Knaebel's 
written demand for inspection of the books and records of RAA 
pursuant to Alaska Stat. § 10.05.240, based on the argument "that 
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if there was a valid contract for the exchange of stock in 
effect, which called for performance prior to the date of 
Knaebel1s demand for inspection, Knaebel could have no right of 
inspection after that date," Jd. at 886. 
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
ruling in favor of RAA, holding that although the exchange 
agreement did not specify the manner of the "exchange" of the 
stock, "some form of physical tender was contemplated, and • • . 
unless and until the exchange occurred, the agreement, at least 
on this point, . . . was executory." Id. at 887 (footnotes 
omitted). The court concluded that there was no basis for the 
argument "that the agreement by itself effectively cancelled 
Knaebel1s shareholder of record status as of October 15, 1980, 
any more than a land sale contract which specifies a date for 
closing cancels a recorded deed on the specified date." Id. The 
court held that Knaebel, who, due to the executory status of the 
exchange agreement continued to be a shareholder of record, was 
therefore entitled by law to examine RAA's books and records. 
Id. at 888. See Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App. 859, 204 
S.E.2d 810, 811 (1974) (shareholder's execution of a contract 
with a third person for the sale of his stock, did not deprive 
the shareholder of his statutory inspection rights); Hoover v. 
Fox Rig & Lumber Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929, 930 (1948) 
(corporation's exercise of its right of first refusal did not 
terminate shareholder's statutory inspection privileges). 
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Summarizing the opinions of the courts that have 
addressed the precise issue presented in the instant case, the 
authors of Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
("Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations") wrote: 
[Stockholders are not precluded from inspecting 
corporate books and records by reason of an executed 
contract for the sale of their stock in the 
corporation. Whether a contract to sell or exchange 
shares is deemed ultimately to be fully executed or 
executory at the time the shareholders demand 
inspection and whether the shareholders' names were 
ever removed from the books determines status, and 
hence whether the shareholders have a right of 
inspection pursuant to shareholder-of-record statutes. 
Fletcher Cvc. Corp. § 2230 (rev. perm, ed.) (footnotes omitted). 
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan have cited no cases, nor 
are there any cases, supporting their argument that Webb is not a 
shareholder of record. In support of their assignment of error 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, Petitioners continue to rely upon 
shareholder examination cases that are patently distinguishable 
from the instant case. The shareholder in each of those cases 
had either (i) received payment for his shares and was subject to 
an action for specific performance, Dierkinq v. Associated Book 
Service, Inc.. 31 Misc. 2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1960) ; (ii) endorsed his shares and delivered them to an escrow 
agent pending full payment of the price, Nash v. Gay Apparel 
Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 768, 175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1958) ; (iii) sold and transferred the shares, although he 
attempted to retain a post-sale right of inspection, Rosenberg v. 
Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18 Misc. 2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 
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(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); or (iv) entered into a binding 
purchase/sale agreement with the purchasing corporation providing 
for installment payments secured by a chattel mortgage on the 
corporation's personalty, Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co.f 
278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 243 (1967). 
Petitioners place particular emphasis on the decision 
in In re Gaines, 4 Misc. 2d 935, 180 N.Y.S. 191 (1919), afffd 190 
App. Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920), which they erroneously 
claim was based on facts similar to those in the instant case. 
In contrast to the instant case, the shareholder who was denied 
the right of inspection in Gaines, had already endorsed his stock 
certificates and delivered them to an escrow agent to whom 
payment for the shares had also been tendered by the company. 
The Gaines court concluded that "the action of petitioner in 
indorsing the stock in blank and delivering the same to the 
Banker's Trust Company in itself divested petitioner of title.I! 
Id. at 192 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Petitioners reliance on Taylor v. Paynes, 118 
Utah 2d 72, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), to support their argument is 
misplaced, because the stock purchase contract in that case was 
held to be "not executory, but a contract of a present purchase 
and sale." Id. at 1072. In further contrast to the instant 
case, the stock certificates in Taylor had already been delivered 
and accepted once. Id. 
Applying the very standards and reasoning of the cases 
cited by Petitioners, the purchase of Webb's stock has never been 
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completed. The option agreement between Webb and R.O.A., by its 
terms, contemplates a consummated sale only after the stock has 
been appraised, payment of the purchase price has been tendered 
and the stock has been endorsed and transferred. 
Petitioners' contention that "payment is irrelevant11 to 
the issue of Webb's shareholder status (Petitioners' Brief at 9) 
is not supported by the authorities Petitioners cite in their 
brief. Petitioners cite Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Corporations § 5628 for the proposition that "passing of title is 
not predicated upon payment of the purchase price." Petitioners' 
Brief at 9-10. A footnote reference ignored by Petitioners to 
the language they quote in their brief, however, clarifies that 
full payment of the purchase price under an installment note is 
not necessary to the passing of title. 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 
§ 5628 n.14 (rev. perm. ed. 1984)(referring reader to § 5613). 
Fletcher further explains at § 5613: 
If the contract indicates that it is the intent of the 
parties that title to the stock and the rights of a 
stockholder shall not pass until some future time, it 
is construed to be an executory contract for the 
purchase and sale of the stock. So if by the terms of 
the contract the buyer is bound to do anything as a 
consideration, either precedent or concurrent, on which 
the passing of the property depends, the property will 
not pass until the condition is fulfilled, even though 
the certificate may be delivered. (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, payment for and delivery of the 
stock are concurrent conditions to the passing of title, neither 
of which conditions has been satisfied. The decisions of Tracy 
v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 
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(1967) and Currey v. Willard Stream Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 
1958), cited in Petitioners' brief, are distinguishable in that 
each case involved a stock purchaser's failure to make payments 
under an installment obligation and stand solely for the 
proposition that full payment under an installment contract is 
not required to pass title. 
Petitioners have not fairly or accurately summarized 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations cited in 
support of their contention that actual delivery of Webb's stock 
certificate is not necessary to pass title to R.O.A. Petitioners1 
Brief at 10. Fletcher plainly states that when a stock purchase 
has been fully completed, title and rights to the stock are not 
necessarily determined by possession of the certificates. 11 
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5094 (rev. perm. ed. 1986). The decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court in Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 
17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965), and Davies v. Semloh Hotel, 
86 Utah 2d 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935), cited by Petitioners, reach 
the same conclusion. 
Based on (i) the statutory definition of a 
"shareholder," (ii) the undisputed fact that Webb continues to 
be, by definition and as a matter of undisputed fact, a 
"shareholder of record" on the books of R.O.A. and has never 
received payment for, endorsed or transferred his R.O.A. stock, 
and (iii) a line of unanimous decisions upholding shareholders' 
rights of inspection until the stock is paid for or the sale of 
the stock is otherwise contractually complete, the opinion of the 
-15-
Court of Appeals is correct and the petition for writ of 
certiorari should be denied. 
POINT II. 
WEBB DID NOT CONTRACT AWAY HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
INSPECT THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF R.O.A. 
Petitioners contended for the first time on appeal that 
Webb somehow waived his rights as a shareholder of record under 
§ 16-10-47(b) by agreeing, in 1981, to submit to an independent 
appraisal to determine the value of his stock if and when the 
stock was ever sold. This argument contradicts Section 16 of the 
Agreement which expressly provides: "The Stockholders shall 
retain all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, 
except those specifically modified by this Agreement." (R. at 
75). The Agreement contains no express or implied waiver by Webb 
of his statutory right of inspection. Moreover, this argument is 
inconsistent with the position R.O.A. took in 1985 when it 
permitted Webb to conduct a shareholder inspection. 
POINT III. 
WEBB'S DEMANDS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A 
PROPER PURPOSE. 
As a matter of law, once a shareholder has alleged a 
proper purpose, it is the duty of the corporation to put forth 
specific facts demonstrating an improper purpose. Goddard v. 
General Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103, 1107 
(1920). The Utah Court of Appeals correctly observed that aside 
from conclusory accusations of harassment and bad faith, there is 
nothing in the record showing that Petitioners have introduced 
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evidence of an improper purpose for Webb's examination. Appendix 
at A-5. In Holmes v. Bishop, the Utah Supreme Court summarized: 
In the answer it also was alleged that the plaintiff 
sought the inspection "For the purpose of harassing and 
annoying the defendants as officers of the said 
Intermountain Mortuary Company and to hinder them in 
the performance of their duties as such and to bring 
them and the said company into disrepute with the 
stockholders of said company and with the public." All 
that is a mere conclusion without any alleged facts to 
support it. 
75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930). 
Petitioners' contention that Webb may not inspect 
R.O.A.'s books and records because he conducted an inspection 
more than two years prior to his demand on April 20, 1987, is 
unavailing. See Petitioners' Brief at 14. There is no statutory 
or case law requirement that a shareholder wait more than two 
years between inspections. The Utah Supreme Court observed in 
Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930), "that 
the plaintiff had been given the privilege of an inspection in 
December, 1928, and on several occasions thereafter, did not 
justify the defendants in refusing a further inspection in 
February, 1929." Prior access to books and records as a director 
of R.O.A. is also irrelevant in determining whether Webb's 
present demand was for a proper purpose. Neither the statute nor 
any case law treats a director/shareholder differently than other 
shareholders. 
Petitioners' contention that Webb's failure to inspect 
R.O.A.'s records prior to R.O.A.'s exercise of the option 
"suggests strongly that [Webb's] demands are meant solely to vex 
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and harass the defendants" is preposterous. Petitioners' Brief 
at 14-15. In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles Enterprises, Inc., 252 
F.2d 498, 499 (3rd Cir. 1958) the court emphasized that until the 
shares are paid for, the shareholder "has a very real interest in 
securing accurate information as to the state of the . . . 
corporation's accounts." Finally, each of the cases cited by 
Petitioners in support of their "delay" argument involved the 
equitable defense of laches, which defense has never been pleaded 
by Petitioners; these cases are simply off target. See eg. Foss 
v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 111. 238, 89 N.E. 351 
(1909)(shareholder had known about mismanagement for almost 48 
years); Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 674, 682 
(Del. Ch. 1978)(former director waited ten years to remedy 
mismanagement). 
Petitioners' repeated attempts throughout this 
litigation to characterize Webb's statutory right of inspection 
as duplicative of his right to have an independent valuation of 
his stock demonstrates, at the very least, Petitioners' 
misunderstanding of one or both of these processes. The broad 
inspection rights granted by the Utah Legislature do not serve 
the same purpose as appraisal rights. The sole purpose of the 
appraisal is to value Webb's stock. Independent appraisers will 
not investigate, on Webb's behalf, any impropriety or 
irregularity with respect to business transacted, or the 
integrity of R.O.A.'s recordkeeping and accounting practices. 
Webb must be able to exercise his statutory inspection right to 
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verify that the valuation of his stock will be based on honest 
and accurate information• 
Petitioners' statements that Webb has refused to sign a 
confidentiality agreement and that Webb has previously usurped a 
corporate opportunity (Petitioners' Brief at 16) have no factual 
foundation in the record whatsoever. The record demonstrates 
that Petitioners have failed to introduce any evidence supporting 
these claims in the proceedings below. 
POINT IV. 
WEBB'S REQUESTS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A 
REASONABLE TIME. 
The first time Webb sought to inspect R.O.A.'s books 
and records, Webb gave R.O.A. more than a month's written notice 
and requested that the inspection occur during regular business 
hours on the premises of R.O.A. Webb honored R.O.A.'s demands 
that the requested examination be postponed until Reagan, 
president of R.O.A., returned from an overseas trip. The second 
request was also for regular business hours on the premises of 
R.O.A. The second request was denied. In his third request, 
Webb permitted Petitioners to choose the time and place and was 
requested by R.O.A. to appear on a specific date at a specific 
time. Upon arriving at R.O.A.'s corporate offices at the 
appointed time, Webb was again refused access. All of these 
facts are undisputed by Petitioners. The Court of Appeals 
accurately described Petitioners' refusals as "repeated stall 
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspection would be 
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granted, then refusing access to the books at the agreed-upon 
time for specious, fluid reasons." Appendix A-5. 
POINT V. 
WEBB IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF SEPARATE 
STATUTORY PENALTIES AND OTHER DAMAGES. 
The primary purpose of shareholder inspection 
legislation is to prescribe penalties so that corporations and 
officers will be less likely to refuse access and "delay 
inspection until the right was actually litigated." ABA-ALI Model 
Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 52, 5 2 (2d ed. 1971) (emphasis added). 
The penalty provisions of the statute must serve as a viable 
deterrent to corporations and their officers. The Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly reasoned that to permit violating parties to 
escape with a single penalty regardless of how many times and for 
how long they refuse to permit inspection effectively allows the 
corporation to purchase multiple and serial exemptions from the 
law for a one-time fee. In the case of minority shareholders, a 
single 10% penalty would normally be a very small price to pay to 
silence opposition. 
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 
353 (1975), cited by Petitioners, authorizes multiple penalties 
for multiple refusals. The well-known principle asserted by 
Petitioners, that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted, 
applies only when the statute is subject to different reasonable 
interpretations. The strict construction of the statutory 
penalty for refusing a shareholder examination would render it 
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meaningless. Naquin v. Air Engineered Systems & Services, Inc.. 
423 So. 2d 713# 716-17 (La. 1983). Given the undisputed fact 
that three separate refusals occurred, the statute demands that 
three separate penalties be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The literal application of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) 
and the authorities cited by the Utah Court of Appeals, all of 
which are directly on point, compel the conclusion that the Court 
of Appeals was correct in ruling that Webb's status and rights as 
a shareholder were not extinguished by R.O.A.'s mere giving 
notice of exercise of option to purchase his stock and that 
separate penalties for each separate refusal to allow inspection 
should be imposed. There are no cases supporting Petitioners1 
arguments to the contrary. 
Webb respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to 
deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and affirm the Court of 
Appeals ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 1989. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
By: ^ f ^ 
Val ^,/CJirirstensen, Esq. 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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3. On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rule 
aes accomplishes just the opposite result. Any 
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is 
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g., Fuller v. 
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest prot-
ection he could have reasonably understood to be 
provided by the policy/); Williams v. First Colony 
Ufe Ins. Co., 593 P2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) 
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed 
in favor of insured); Dieoes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no 
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an 
insured). See MISO Colard v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an 
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage 
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence, 
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American 
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are 
construed to accomplish the object of providing 
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89, 
91 (1985) ('When an ambiguity exists, the court 
roust construe the policy so as to sustain indem-
nity. "). 
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit lang-
uage clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage 
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the 
question of whether such coverage was intended. 
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through 
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather 
than by invoking the stria construction rule. See 
generally Wtlburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
5. We do not suggest that the presence of other 
insurance is irrelevant in such cases. In an action for 
breach of a contract to provide insurance, the 
measure of general damages is typically the amount 
the policy would have paid had it been obtained. See, 
e.g., PPG Indust. v. Continental Heller Corp., 
124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 108, 113-114 (1979). That 
amount could readily be affected by the existence of 
two or more policies (including policies of insurance 
which should have been obtained as contractually 
required) providing coverage for the same loss. See, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-307(2) (1986). 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Roland Webb filed this action against 
R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), a Utah 
corporation, and William Reagan, its majority 
shareholder, and others, in part to enforce his 
claimed right to examine R.O.A/s corporate 
books and records pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §16-1047(b) (1987), a section of the 
Utah Business Corporation Act (the "Act*). 
He also sought the imposition of penalties 
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) 
for respondents' refusals to permit such an 
examination. The trial court, on cross-
motions for partial summary judgment on 
these claims, ruled Webb had no inspection 
rights because he had ceased being a shareh-
older of record within the meaning of the 
statute. We reverse. 
Webb and Reagan formed R.O.A. by 
written agreement dated July 7, 1981. Reagan 
received eighty percent of the stock and Webb 
the remaining twenty percent. Reagan remains 
the controlling shareholder and corporate 
president. The incorporation agreement gives 
R.O.A. an option to purchase Webb's shares, 
but the option provisions do not fix a purc-
hase price. Instead, after the option is exerc-
ised, the parties are to engage in an alternating 
appraisal process to arrive at a price, begin-
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ning with an appraiser selected by the seller. 
The final pricing step is that "any appraisal 
agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall 
be binding on the parties hereto absent 
fraud." No time frame or deadline is specified 
for the appraisal process. When this process 
yields a purchase price, the agreement provides 
alternative payment terms: (1) in cash; (2) 120 
equal monthly payments with interest; or (3) 
such other terms as may be agreed to by the 
parties. The agreement contains no provision 
or time frame for delivery of the stock. 
Reagan served Webb with a notice of 
R.O.A.'s exercise of its option dated Jcnuary 
27, 1987. The notice did not identify any 
price, select any terms of payment, or propose 
any time frame for the stock conveyance. 
Reagan's notice invited Webb to meet with 
him at Webb's earliest convenience "to discuss 
information which I have concerning the value 
of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock" and other 
aspects of the transaction. 
According to the facts set forth by Webb in 
affidavits filed in support of his motion for 
partial summary judgment, Webb pledged his 
stock in March 1987, at R.O.A.'s request, to 
secure a bank loan to R.O.A. On April 20, 
1987, Webb submitted to R.O.A. a written 
request to examine the corporate books and 
records pursuant to section 16-10-47 in 
order to protect his interests as a shareholder 
and determine R.O.A.'s actual financial 
condition. R.O.A.'s vice president of admin-
istration and, finance responded in a letter 
dated May s\ 1987, suggesting that Webb (1) 
postpone the inspection a few weeks because 
of the departure of a key employee in the 
accounting department, (2) specify which 
records were to be examined, and (3) wait a 
few weeks until Reagan returned to town. 
Webb, through one of his accountants, then 
sent an itemized list of the specific records and 
documents he wanted to examine. 
On May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel sent a 
letter notifying R.O.A. of the appraiser sele-
cted and of Webb's intent to proceed with the 
inspection of the corporate records on May 
27, 1987, a normal business day, beginning at 
10:00 a.m. On May 26, R.O.A.'s counsel, 
William Adams, delivered to the offices of 
Webb's counsel a letter stating that the books 
would be made available for inspection when 
the selected appraiser, not other accountants, 
wanted to examine them. Webb's counsel and 
accountants proceeded to R.O.A.'s corporate 
offices on May 27, as planned, but were 
refused access to the books and records by 
Adams, after consultation with Reagan. 
On May 29, Webb commenced this lawsuit. 
On June 3, 1987, his counsel submitted to 
R.O.A. another written notice of Webb's 
intent to have his accountants inspect the 
corporate records, this time on June 5, 1987. 
Webb's counsel was informed by Adams on 
June 4 that the inspection would not be 
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allowed by. R.O.A. because it would disrupt 
business and there was no staff person avail-
able to find the company's files. This refusal 
was confirmed in a letter from Adams that 
afternoon stating that R.O.A. staff would be 
available one-half day each day for the week 
commencing June 15,1987. 
Webb's counsel and accountants appeared 
at R.O.A. offices at 9:00 a.m. on June 15, but 
were again refused access to the books and 
records by Reagan and Hall, another R.O.A. 
attorney, who asserted for the first time that 
Webb had no inspection right because of 
R.O.A.*s January 1987 notice of its exercise 
of the stock purchase option. 
Webb then amended his complaint to add 
allegations about the two June refusals. In his 
second cause of action, he requested recovery 
of a statutory penalty under section 16-ld-
47(c) against R.O.A., and against Reagan and 
Adams separately for each of the three refu-
sals of inspection. He also sought injunctive 
relief to enforce his inspection rights under 
section 16-10-47(b). His ensuing motion for 
partial summary judgment on this cause of 
action was filed only against R.O.A. and 
Reagan, although he specifically reserved the 
right to proceed subsequently against Adams 
and Hall. 
In their cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment, R.O.A. and Reagan argued Webb's 
statutory right to examine the corporate books 
terminated as a matter of law when R.O.A. 
gave notice of exercise of its option to purc-
hase his stock, even though he was still shown 
on the corporate books as a holder of twenty 
percent of the stock and had neither endorsed, 
delivered, or received payment for his shares. 
They also filed the affidavits of Reagan and 
R.O.A.'s vice president in opposition to 
Webb's motion, purporting to create material 
issues of fact about the reasonableness of their 
refusal of his inspection requests, even if he 
retained his inspection rights under the statute. 
The affiants, however, did not deny the facts 
asserted in Webb's supporting affidavits, 
including the fact that Webb had been refused 
access to the books and records on May 27, 
June 4, and June 15. They merely claimed that 
Webb had been provided monthly financial 
statements and access to the corporate records 
prior to July 1986 and asserted that his requ-
ests were not reasonable, citing several excuses 
for the refusals, such as lack of key personnel 
and disruption of the business. They also 
argued that Webb's requests were vexatious 
and went beyond the information he really 
needed. In his affidavit, Reagan accused Webb 
of making the requests in bad faith to harass 
the corporation. No facts were asserted to 
support these conclusory claims or to dispute 
the purpose asserted by Webb, i.e., to protect 
his interests as minority shareholder and det-
ermine the true financial condition of the 
corporation. Affiant Reagan did dispute 
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Webb's assertion that his stock was worth 
more than $50,000, contending that, even if 
there was a refusal of Webb's lawful inspec-
tion demand, the statutory penalty could not 
be calculated until the value of Webb's shares 
was determined according to the terms of their 
agreement. 
The trial court agreed with the respondents 
and held that Webb's inspection right and his 
status as a shareholder of record under section 
16-10-47(b) terminated when R.O.A. exer-
cised its purchase option. That ruling presents 
a narrow legal issue of first impression in 
Utah. 
Section 16-10-47(b) provides: 
Any person who is a shareholder! 1) 
of record, upon written demand 
stating the purpose thereof, shall 
have the right to examine, in 
person, or by agent or attorney, at 
any reasonable time or times, for 
any proper purpose, Its books and 
records of account, minutes and 
record of shareholders and to make 
extracts therefrom. A proper 
purpose means a purpose reason-
ably related to the person's interest 
as a shareholder. 
On appeal, we review the trial court's con-
clusions of law for correctness, with no part-
icular deference to the trial court. Crecr v. 
Valley Bank & Trust, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(1988); Western Kane County Special Scrv. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). That same lack of 
deference applies to the trial court's interpr-
etation of an unambiguous, integrated cont-
ract, ZSon's First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. 
Tide A Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 
1988), and to* its interpretation of statutes, 
Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 
(1989); Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
1988), both of which present questions of law. 
The issue central to this appeal is the nature 
of the contract the parties intended to create 
at the time of the exercise of R.O.A.'s purc-
hase option. See Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 
61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1950); Jones v. 
Commercial Inv. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 
896, 900 (1924). That intent must be determ-
ined as a matter of law from the nature and 
text of the entire written agreement itself, if 
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); accord 12A F7ef-
chcr Cyc. Corp. §5613 (1984). In other 
words, did the parties intend title to Webb's 
stock to be transferred to R.O.A. upon exer-
cise of the option, leaving executory only their 
respective purchase and sale obligations under 
the contract?1 Or did they intend that exercise 
of the option would create a wholly executory 
contract to sell the shares, with title to remain 
in Webb until transferred to R.O.A. at some 
subsequent time? 
Here, the agreement of the parties did not 
specify the time for transfer of legal title to 
Webb's shares or their actual delivery. But it 
did leave open for determination, after exer-
cise of R.O.A.'s purchase option, both the 
purchase price and the final terms of payment, 
without specifying the time frame for the 
completion of those determinations. Thus, the 
parties recognized there must be further agr-
eement on each of these terms after R.O.A.'s 
notice. These terms and the parties, use of the 
potentially lengthy appraisal process to set the 
price of Webb's stock compel the 'conclusion 
that they did not intend that Webb would 
immediately divest himself of legal ownership 
of the shares at the moment the option was 
exercised, but that he would retain legal title 
until some later time when these essential 
terms of the sale were completed. It is thus 
clear from the agreement itself that the parties 
intended legal ownership to transfer to R.O.A. 
at some point after notice was given, concur-
rent with a subsequent event, such as fuU 
payment or commencement of installment 
payments.* 
This interpretation of the parties* agreement 
is buttressed by the uncontroverted facts that 
Webb pledged his stock at R.O.A.'s request 
even after R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of its 
option and, at least until June 15, R.O.A. and 
Reagan treated Webb as the legal owner of the 
shares. It is also consistent with the conclus-
ions of other courts in cases involving similar 
agreements and similar inspection rights. 
For example, in £srare of Bishop v. Antilles 
Enters., Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3rd Or. 1958), the 
shareholders of the respondent corporation 
entered into a cross-purchase agreement 
providing that, upon the death of shareholder 
Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the 
option to purchase his shares from his estate 
at book value. Following Bishop's death, 
Vose, one of* the surviving shareholders, ass-
erted his right to purchase Bishop's stock 
from his estate. Vose claimed the stock was 
worthless and tendered $1.00 in payment. The 
district court held that the estate was entitled, 
as a holder of legal title, to exercise its 
common law right to examine the corpora-
tion's books and records. On appeal, the 
respondent corporation contended that "by 
virtue of the agreement between the stockho-
lders, title to And ownership of Bishop's stock 
had passed to Vose immediately upon the 
election of the latter to purchase it." Id. at 
499. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
the corporation's argument and held that, 
even assuming Vosc's election of the option to 
purchase the stock vested his right to transfer 
of the stock upon payment of the purchase 
price, it did not divest the estate administrator 
of legal title to the shares or of the rights of a 
stockholder. Id. Moreover, the court concl-
uded, assuming the agreement to sell the stock 
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was valid and binding, 
the [administrator's) right ... to 
have access to the books and 
records of the corporation certainly 
will continue at least until after the 
proper amount of the purchase 
price has been authoritatively dete-
rmined and has been paid. Until 
then it is obvious that the petitioner 
has a very real interest in securing 
accurate information as to the state 
of the respondent corporation's 
accounts.... 
Id. 
Similarly, in Knacbcl v. Hcincr, 673 P.2d 
885 (Alaska 1983), a shareholder, Knaebel, 
had executed a valid contract that called for 
the exchange of his shares (for stock in 
another corporation) prior to the date of his 
demand for inspection. Heiner, custodian of 
the corporation's records, refused Knaebel's 
written demand for inspection of the books 
and records under a statute extending that 
right to a 'shareholder of record for at least 
six months" or a "holder of record of at least 
five percent of all the outstanding shares of a 
corporation." Id. at 885 & n.l. Heiner argued 
that, if there was a valid contract calling for 
the exchange of Knaebcl's stock on a certain 
date prior to his demand for inspection, he 
could have no right of inspection after that 
date. Id. at 886. 
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rej-
ected this argument and held that the contract 
was executory until the exchange of the shares 
actually took place. Thus, the agreement by 
itself did not cancel Knaebel's status as a 
shareholder of record for purposes of the 
inspection statute, "any more than a land sale 
contract which specifics a date for closing 
cancels a recorded deed on the specified date." 
Id. at 887. See also Shelters, Inc. v. Man kin, 
130 Ga. App. 859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974) 
(executory contract to sell stock to third party 
did not deprive shareholder of statutory right 
of- inspection); Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber 
Co., 199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948) 
(despite corporation's exercise of option to 
purchase stock, shareholder retained title as 
legal owner together with statutory right of 
inspection). 
We conclude that the contract formed when 
the notice of exercise of option was given to 
Webb constituted a contract to sell the shares, 
with legal title remaining in Webb after that 
-point in time. Accordingly, R.O.A.'s notice of 
exercise of its option pursuant to the parties' 
agreement did not terminate Webb's status as 
a shareholder of record for purposes of 
section 16-10-47(b). The trial court erred in 
ruling otherwise. 
We next address briefly R.O.A.'s claim that 
Webb waived or contracted away his statutory 
right of inspection because the parties* agre-
ement provided for an appraisal procedure to 
be followed after the option notice was served. 
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. Hunter v. Hu uert 669 P.2d 430, 
431 (Utah 1983). "It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied." Id. 
(quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 
(1968)). Assuming the statutory right could be 
contracted away consistent with public policy, 
R.O.A. has not identified any contract prov-
ision which either expressly or impliedly 
waives or modifies Webb's statutory inspec-
tion right. Indeed, Section 16 of their agree-
ment, captioned "Rights of Ownership," 
states, "The Stockholders shall retain all their 
rights as stockholders of the Corporation, 
except those specifically modified by this 
Agreement." We conclude there was no waiver 
or contractual surrender of Webb's rights as a 
shareholder under section 16-10-47. 
We turn now to the issue of statutory pen-
alties against R.O.A. and Reagan. Utah Code 
Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1987) provides: 
Any officer or agent who, or a 
corporation which, shall refuse to 
allow any such shareholder, or his 
agent or attorney, so to examine 
and make extracts from its books 
and records of account, minutes, 
and record of shareholders, for any 
proper purpose, shall be liable to 
such shareholder in a penalty of 
\0°7o of the value of the shares 
owned by such shareholder, in 
addition to any other damages or 
remedy afforded him by law; but 
no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. 
It shall be a defense to any action 
for penalties under this section that 
the person suing therefor has within 
two years sold or offered for sale 
any list of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corpora-
tion or has aided or abetted any 
person in procuring any list of 
shareholders for any such purpose, 
or has improperly used any infor-
mation secured through any prior 
examination of the books and 
records of account, or minutes, or 
record of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corpora-
tion, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in 
making his demand. 
As a shareholder of record, Webb had a right 
to examine the corporate books pursuant to 
section 16-10-47(b) at a reasonable time 
upon written demand.4 The statute limits the 
shareholder's inspection right only insofar as 
the requested examination must be for a 
"proper purpose," defined in that subsection 
as one ^reasonably related to the person's 
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interest as a shareholder." 
There is no question that Webb made the 
necessary written demands for inspection of 
R.O.A/s books and records at reasonable 
times, i.e., during normal business hours. Sec 
Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 272, 93 P. 
729, 731 (1908). Based on the undisputed facts 
in the record, we find that, as a matter of law, 
Webb's inspection requests were for a proper 
purpose within the meaning of the act, 
namely* to determine the corporation's true 
financial condition and thereby protect his 
interests as a minority shareholder in the 
process of selling his shares. 
In their response to Webb's motion for 
partial summary judgment, R.O.A. and 
Reagan did not dispute the stated facts conc-
erning the direct refusals of Webb's demands 
for inspection on three occasions. Instead, 
their supporting affidavits merely offered 
excuses which, even if true, would not estab-
lish any of the defenses to an action for pen-
alties enumerated in section 16-10-47(c), 
and made conclusory allegations of bad faith 
without asserting any supportive facts.5 See 
Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. FridaJ, 
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987); Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723,725 (Utah 1985). 
R.O.A.'s and Reagan's repeated stall 
tactics, first leading Webb to believe inspec-
tion would be granted, then refusing access to 
the books at the agreed-upon time for spec-
ious, fluid reasons, represent exactly the type 
of conduct by a corporation or its officers or 
agents that the statute is designed to curtail 
through the imposition of penalties. Without 
sanctions to discourage the refusal of proper 
inspection requests, the corporation or its 
officers 'could, by refusing access, delay ins-
pection until the right was actually litigated." 
2 Model Business Corporation Act §52 
commentary at 129 (2d ed. 1971). 
Section 16-10-47(c) clearly authorizes the 
imposition of a penalty for each refusal to 
•allow inspection. Unlike the shareholders in 
Meyer v. Ford Industries, Inc., 272 Or. 531, 
538 P.2d 353 (1975), who sought the imposi-
tion of eight statutory penalties because that 
was the number of items they had asked to 
inspect, Webb made three separate and inde-
pendent requests, which were separately 
refused. We agree with Webb that, if the 
statute is to have any deterrent effect, viola-
ting parties should not be permitted to purc-
hase multiple and serial exemptions from the 
law's mandate for a one-time penalty fee, 
regardless of how often they refuse distinct, 
lawful shareholder demands for inspection of 
the corporate records.* 
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, 
Reagan, as an individual, and R.O.A., as an 
entity, each participated in the May 27 and 
June 15 refusals; R.O.A., as an entity, was a 
participant in the June 4 refusal, while 
Reagan, as an individual, was not. See gene-
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Webb is, therefore, entitled to partial 
summary judgment against each responsible 
respondent in the amount of the mandatory 
statutory penalty for each of the three separate 
refusals to allow him to exercise his inspection 
rights as a shareholder. 
Because the statute sets the amount of each 
penalty at ten percent of the value of the 
shareholder's shares plus other damages, not 
to exceed $5,000, and the parties' agreement 
dictates that the value of Webb's shares is to 
be determined through the appraisal process, 
the amount of each penalty must be fixed by 
the trial court on remand after the valuation is 
complete and Webb has been afforded an 
opportunity to present' evidence concerning 
any other damages to which he is entitled.. 
The partial summary judgment entered in 
favor of respondents is reversed. The case is 
remanded for entry of partial summary judg-
ment against Reagan and R.O.A., in accord-
ance with this opinion, and for further proc-
eedings to determine the amount of the stat-
utory penalty to be imposed on them for each 
of the three separate wrongful refusals to 
permit inspection of the corporate books and 
records. In addition, the district court is dir-
ected to grant forthwith Webb's request for 
injunctive relief enforcing his statutory inspe-
ction right. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The Act defines a shareholder as "one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah 
Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1987) (redesignated as 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(11) (1988)). 
2. The issue presented in Taylor v. Daynes, 118 
Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), was whether oral 
negotiations about the sale of stock, coupled with 
the parties* conduct and a written memorandum, 
constituted an executory contract to purchase the 
stock or a present purchase and sale accompanied 
by an immediate transfer of interest when the stock 
certificates were handed over to the purchaser. The 
trial court's finding that the parties intended a 
contract of immediate sale and purchase was upheld 
by the Utah Supreme Court as supported by the 
evidence at trial. Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072. In an 
earlier case involving the interpretation of a written 
agreement by an employer to repurchase stock sold 
to an employee if the employee was discharged, the 
court determined that the parties had intended title 
to the stocks to transfer to the employer immedia-
tely upon the occurrence of the condition subseq-
uent, i.e., the employee's discharge. Davks v. 
Semlob Hotel. 86 Utah 318,44 P.2d 689 (1935). 
3. In the context of a preliminary agreement for the 
sale of an apartment building, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
There is implied in an agreement for the 
sale of real estate, unless a contrary 
intention is expressed, that the vendor 
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shall retain title until the balance of the 
purchase price is paid. Where there is an 
agreement on the part of one to convey 
and on the pan of another to pay a 
definite sum, payment and conveyance 
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary 
intention appears. [ 
Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893, 895 
(1946). 
4. Any corporate agent or officer with custody or I 
control of corporate books who refuses a bona fide I 
shareholder's lawful demand for their inspection or | 
copying is also guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-708 (1978). 
5. In a second affidavit filed with the trial court, 
Reagan sought to justify the refusals on the basis I 
that the records Webb sought to examine were I 
confidential. This fact alone, however, is insufficient 
to deny the statutory inspection right. See Fears v. 
Cattlemen's Inv. Co., 483 P.2d 724, 730 (Okla. 
1971). 
6. By the same token, penalties should not be arti-
ficially compounded by identical, repetitious requ-
ests that prompt multiple, predictable refusals. Form 
is not to be elevated over substance in determining 
the number of independent requests- made by a 
shareholder of record, each of which qualifies for a 
separate penalty if refused. There might be cases in 
which multiple 'requests* would be more properly 
regarded as a single request repeatedly renewed. 
However, this is not such a case. It is clear that 
three separate requests were made by Webb and 
refused, as evidenced by the passage of time 
between requests and the inconsistent variety of I 
responses. Webb's first request to examine the 
books and records on May 27 was denied for the 
express reason that only Webb's appraiser, not his 
accountants, was a proper agent. His June 3 inspe-
ction request, on the other hand, was denied 
because it would be disruptive and no staff was 
available to find the necessary files, which had been 
identified by Webb in early May. Instead, Webb 
was informed, the inspection would proceed on June 
15, with R.O.A. staff available at that time. When 
Webb's agents appeared on June 15, as instructed, 
access to the corporate records was again refused, 
this time because of Webb's alleged lack of 
'shareholder of record * status. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Greg Phillip Casias was convi-
cted by a jury of burglary in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1978), and two 
counts of second degree theft in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6404 (1978). Casias 
appeals from his convictions claiming the trial 
court erred in allowing 1) photocopies of his 
palm prints into evidence, and 2) the State to 
charge him for two counts of theft under §76-
6-404, theft of a firearm, a second degree 
felony under §76-6-412(lXa)(ii). and theft 
of property valued in excess of $1,000, a 
s econd deg ree fe lony u n d e r §76-6 -
412OXaX0» which arose from the same crim-
inal episode. Although we affirm Casias's 
convictions for burglary and one count of. 
second degree theft, we find submitting two 
counts of theft to the jury and the resulting 
convictions thereon was error. We, therefore, 
remand the matter to the trial court to vacate 
one of the theft convictions. 
FACTS 
On May 14, 1987, a private residence in 
Summit Park, Utah, was burglarized. Items 
reported missing included personal property 
worth over S1,000 and a .25-caliber autom-
atic pistol. During the investigation, police 
officers found a beer can in the bedroom of 
the homeowner's daughter. The beer can was 
sent to the state crime lab to recover latent 
fingerprints. The fingerprint expert at the lab 
recovered a left palm print and several finge-
"rprints from the can. 
On May 28, 1987, the Salt Lake County 
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